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[Vol. 25:1 sexual slavery. 5 Conventional wisdom is that the sexual enslavement of a child is so unanimously condemned under international law that it garners the highest rebuke. 6 A government's complicity in the systemic sexual enslavement of its population of children is an abnegation of its sovereign responsibility.
7 Such action subjects the offending government to sanctions or military intervention under the United Nations' Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 8 This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that prohibitions against government-condoned child-sex slavery have attained nonderogable, peremptory status under international law. Much to the utter shock of field investigators and human rights experts, boy sex slavery has evolved into a constitutive and central feature of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan) because of a customary practice commonly referred to as bacha bazi. 
"Sex trafficking involves forced sex, i.e., rape, and thus constitutes one of the most egregious crimes that humans can inflict upon one another."). 7 Samuel V. Jones 575-76 (2014) (reasoning that an Afghan bacha bazi boy that is raped and forced to prostitute himself and dress like a girl is better off than an Afghan girl that is forced to dress like a boy in order to obtain an education, even though she is not raped or forced into prostitution). [Vol. 25:1 Put succinctly, this essay represents a first step in reducing the knowledge gap relative to boy sex slavery that remains so extant in sex trafficking legal discourse. In so doing, Part II discusses the structural dynamics that enable bacha bazi, the perilous existence of boy victims, the Afghan government's unfettered complicity in bacha bazi, the relevant findings of the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), and the threat bacha bazi poses to the preservation of international peace and security. Part III provides an overview of the development and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine relative to sexual violence. It explains specific features of the United Nations' Responsibility to Protect doctrine that were strategically crafted to omit governmentcondoned boy sexual slavery, such as bacha bazi, from triggering humanitarian based intervention.
II. BACHA BAZI IN AFGHANISTAN
Bacha bazi, or "boy for play," involves men known as bacha baz, or "boy players," collectively exploiting, enslaving, or raping young boys in a systematic and organized fashion. 16 The unabated influence and impunity of wealthy Afghan merchants, illegal armed groups, and government officials drive the demand that propels bacha bazi. Meanwhile, robust poverty, communal nihilism, and a large number of young, vulnerable, and displaced Afghan boys enable its supply.
17
Boys that become bacha bazi victims are typically destitute and without relatives.
18 But many extremely poor families, sometimes on the verge of starvation, often sell their sons to bacha baz, 19 or permit bacha baz to "adopt" their sons in exchange for food, clothing, or money. 20 Other boys are lured with false promises of a better life via vocational education, responsible supervision, or employment. 
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ENDING BACHA BAZI BOY SEX SLAVERY 67 find boys on the streets, in the marketplace, 22 or in other public places, such as rest stops where young, hungry boys are known to prostitute themselves. 23 Many boys are simply abducted.
24
Bacha bazi boys are typically forced to dress up in female attire, wear bells on their feet, dance for the entertainment of their bacha baz, 25 or they are rented out for male-only parties where they perform dance routines and are sexually exploited. 26 If the boys do not dance or perform in a way that pleases observers, the bacha baz beat them. 27 Once the dancing ends, the boys are generally sold to the highest bidder or shared sexually amongst wealthy or influential Afghan men. 28 Some men fight over the boys, which sometimes ends in the death of a bacha bazi boy. 29 For those Afghan men who cannot afford a bacha bazi boy, videos of the boys are typically sold on the streets in major Afghan cities.
30
The bacha bazi boys' existential identities are inextricably defined by a wide variety of emotional and psychological scars inflicted by their captors, whom they typically despise. 31 The boys, who know no other life except as chattel, routinely refer to their bacha baz as "my Lord."
32 Many fear for their lives, hopelessly questioning how they will escape bondage or survive. 33 They do not report their capture out of fear of stigma, honor killing, or reprisal.
34 They're told if they escape, their families will be murdered. 35 A particular brand of sorrow evolves, fueled by a sense of 22 The boys that survive until the age of nineteen, or until they grow a beard, are typically released from servitude because they no longer possess the prepubertal features bacha baz find appealing.
37
Ripe with psychological and emotional shame, 38 and having been denied the opportunity to learn marketable labor skills necessary to support themselves, many bacha bazi boys become bacha baz themselves, often turning to drugs and alcohol as a coping mechanism. 39 Other boys remain with their captors after becoming men, fully aware of the circumstances under which they first encountered their captors. One Afghan man admitted, "I was only fourteen years-old when a former Uzbek commander forced me to have sex with him. . . . Later, I quit my family and became his secretary. I have been with him for ten [10] years. I am now grown up, but he still loves me and I sleep with him."
40 Put succinctly, once a boy becomes a victim of bacha bazi, he is typically deranged and emotionally traumatized for life.
A. The Subordinated Status of Afghan Women Contributes to Bacha Bazi
Most Afghan men that keep bacha bazi boys have wives. 41 Reportedly, a popular Afghan adage is that "women are for children, boys are for pleasure."
42 Such sentiments help explain why in some parts of Afghanistan, such as Kandahar, a city heralded for its "beardless boys" 43 and high instances of bachi bazi, women are largely subordinated and banned from participating in many aspects of public life. 44 A woman that has sex outside of marriage can be put to death, along with her partner.
36 See Abawi, supra note 9; see also Jones, supra note 12, at 1151 ("As with most victims of sex trafficking, such acts wreak havoc on the child's physical, psychological, and social well-being, resulting in headaches, stomach aches, eating disorders, fear, anxiety, depression, declining grades, aggression, and increased likelihood of adolescent prostitution, substance abuse, and suicide attempts."). 37 While, conversely, men routinely have sex with bacha bazi boys and force the boys to accompany them on public errands, at parties, and even to their homes, effectually undermining and subordinating the Afghan wife or mother. 45 When an Afghan man, who kept a young boy, was asked what the boy's family thought, he merely shrugged and countered that it was not an issue "because the boy's father had died," showing no concern for the feelings or rights of the child's mother. 46 Another Afghan man reported:
I was married to a woman 20 years ago, she left me because of my boy. . . . I was playing with my boy every night and was away from home, eventually my wife decided to leave me. I am happy with my decision because I am used to sleeping and entertaining with my young boy.
47
Put succinctly, bacha bazi not only enslaves Afghan children, it relegates Afghan women, namely mothers and wives, to a grim and subordinated state of existence.
In most parts of the world, the sexual exploitation or enslavement of a child would be considered repugnant, morally objectionable, and criminal. But in Afghanistan, enslaving and sexually exploiting a boy is no more disparaging and injurious to an Afghan man's reputation than was having a slave in the Antebellum South. Like the Antebellum South slave master, enslaving an Afghan boy appears to enhance an Afghan man's financial status and reputation. The more physically appealing and talented the bacha bazi boy is perceived to be, the more he enriches his captor's social and financial standing. 48 As one Afghan woman explained, "[h]aving a boy has become a custom for us. Whoever wants to show off, should have a boy." 49 For that reason, Afghan men openly flaunt their bacha bazi boys.
Contention exists regarding the legitimacy of bacha bazi under Islamic law. Many Afghans strongly object to bacha bazi on grounds that it is homosexual in nature, and banned by Islamic tradition. 50 
B. The Afghan Government Condones Bacha Bazi
Regardless of whether Islamic law prohibits bacha bazi, United Nations officials and human rights organizations widely view it as an unacceptable form of child sexual servitude. 53 But unlike many forms of organized child sexual slavery, bacha bazi flourishes, unabated, with seemingly tacit approval of the Afghan government despite its contrary treaty obligations.
54
The Security Council has flatly condemned the deplorable circumstances affecting Afghan children and urged the Afghan government "to take immediate and specific measures to put an end to and prevent the perpetration of . . . bacha bazi." 55 The United Nations published a detailed manual tailored to help the Afghanistan government implement a legal framework for banning child sex trafficking. 56 The Afghan government also 58 Still, the Afghan government has failed to implement an effective system of justice designed to enforce these treaty obligations and prohibit the rape of male children. 59 Upon receiving news that bacha bazi represented a grave breach of its human rights obligations, Afghan President Hamid Karzai dismissed the idea of instituting immediate measures to protect Afghan's boys from sexual servitude, and replied, "[l]et us win the war first. Then we will deal with such matters." 60 Not only is the Afghan government known to prosecute boy victims of bacha bazi, rather than the adult male victimizers, 61 but state officials sexually exploit young boys with alarming impunity. 62 Some Afghan provincial governors are known to openly keep bacha bazi harems. 63 Afghanistan's military and police officials are some of the most vigorous sexual predators 64 and make no effort to conceal their sexual exploitation of [Vol. 25:1
Afghan's boy population. 65 Numerous Afghan boys are detained and sexually assaulted in government facilities without charges or an opportunity to have the legality of their imprisonment reviewed by a court. 66 Frontline's documentary, The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan, presented video footage of Afghan police officers openly fondling young Afghan boys. 67 An Afghan Thursday night tradition involves uniformed Afghan police officers lining up several pre-teen boys and taking a select few into the police station for hours at a time. 68 The discoveries reported in the documentary not only comport with findings made by the Security Council, but also validate reports by the U.S. State Department, which found that the Afghan government has failed to make "discernible progress in protecting victims of trafficking" and its officials systematically engage in the "sexual abuse of boys." 69 In May 2014, the U.N. Secretary-General officially designated the Afghan National Police and Local Police as "parties" that engage "in the recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against children, the killing and maiming of children, recurrent attacks on schools and/or hospitals and recurrent attacks or threats of attacks against protected personnel in contravention of international law." 70 Because of bacha bazi's resurgence after being banned by the Taliban, and the Afghan government's complicity in the practice, obtaining an accurate count of child victims of bacha bazi is virtually impossible. 71 But at least one observer has noted that approximately "half the Pashtun tribal members in Kandahar and other southern towns are bacha baz." 72 Observers claim that at least one out of every five Afghan weddings include bacha bazi.
73
Bacha bazi so freely permeates Afghanistan that it now threatens the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan government. The woeful reality of the Afghan government's complicity in bacha bazi and absence of an effective legal infrastructure to halt its growth has left scores of Afghans with a seething outrage and deep-rooted doubt regarding the international community's resolve to do justice. The festering sore of oppression and government corruption is so heightened that many Afghan citizens now prefer Taliban rule. 74 Many insurgents continue to fight in Afghanistan because they view the Taliban as the only viable alternative to the existing government, which they deem too corrupt to provide "basic needs such as long term employment, schools, hospitals and a justice system." 75 The Afghan government's failure to safeguard its populace from sexual violence has significantly undermined U.S. counterinsurgency objectives, raising serious questions about prospects for peace and security in the region. 76 There is no question that the success of U.S. counterinsurgency policy relies principally on the protection of the Afghan populace. In 2009, the U.S. announced that the safeguarding of Afghan citizens would even take precedence over attempts to kill the Taliban. 77 The perilous reality of systemic child sex trafficking in Afghanistan has reduced prospects for peace and security, prompting serious questions as to whether the international community has an obligation to intervene on behalf of the victims under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROTECT ENDANGERED POPULATIONS FROM CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING
As a member state of the United Nations, the Afghan government is obligated to respect international human rights. 78 The U.N. Charter bars [Vol. 25:1 member states from intervening in the internal affairs of another member state, unless in self-defense. 79 Despite the purportedly non-derogable, jus cogens status of international prohibitions against slavery and rape, 80 and the well-documented episodes of sexual violence that occurred in Rwanda and Kosovo, the United Nations has not adopted a legal framework by which member states can appropriately intervene in distressed nations, such as Afghanistan, to prevent systemic child sex trafficking.
22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 542 (2006) ("In the last 50 years, national legal systems have qualitatively advanced far more than during the preceding 7,000 years. This advance is largely due to the impact of international human rights norms on national legislation. . . . [T]o some extent, this permeation of international human rights norms and standards has also occurred in the international legal system."); Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter states that among the UN's purposes is to "achieve international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 
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When the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 81 considered whether member states should have a right to intervene, it proposed that the well-established principle of nonintervention should yield to the international responsibility to protect endangered populations in "situations of compelling human need," via "sanctions," "prosecution," and "in extreme cases, military intervention." 82 ICISS developed the Responsibility to Protect doctrine based on its recognition that member states have an obligation to protect their citizens from "mass murder," "rape," and "starvation." When member states are "unwilling or unable" to meet these commitments, "that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states." 83 In an apparent effort to exclude child sex slavery practices, like bacha bazi, ICISS proposed that intervention would only be justified in circumstances where the rape committed involved "systematic rape for political purposes of women of a particular group either as another form of terrorism, or as a means of changing the ethnic composition of that group." 84 ICISS emphasized that its goal was "to focus on protecting communities from mass killing," and "women" rather than boys "from systematic rape," and "children from starvation." 85 
